

















In this article, it reviewed around the case of the discretion in use of “executive power” by the
President of United States of America as the authority of the state leader.
For the president to maintain his status, the public opinion must be controlled about the






The Discretion in Use of Executive Power by State Leader
― Around Case of the President of United States of America ―
his policy.
However, it does not always realize interests of the public. It is used to realize his plan.
Therefore, controlling this power properly under the Constitutional authority is the most
important.
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裁判所、特に連邦最高裁が“裁量”で移送令状(writ of certiorari)や人身保護令状(writ of
habeas corpus)を発付して、事件を自ら審査するということはよく知られている29が、検察官が自ら
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５ See Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare : How Executive Power Threatens American
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